Safety Critical Systems are those systems that can potentially lead to loss of life, injury, and environmental damage. Therefore such systems have to be designed and built to meet a variety of functional and non-functional requirements, including safety, reliability, availability, and maintainability. It is essential to assess, as an independent activity, the extent to which these requirements have been met, and for complex systems there is no single analysis technique which can be employed. It is therefore necessary to use a number of different safety (and reliability) analysis techniques to perform an assessment. Using a variety of techniques raises issues of consistency-if the individual analyses and models are inconsistent with respect to each other then the overall assessment is likely to be inconsistent, and therefore not trustworthy. In this paper we present a set of rules that should hold between a representative set of safety analysis techniques, demonstrate how they can be enforced and checked by an underpinning data model, and describe a software tool (based on these ideas) to support integraed safety analysis.
INTRODUCTION

Safety Critical Systems and Safety Analysis
Safety Critical Systems are those systems that can potentially lead to loss of life, injury, and environmental damage. Therefore such systems have to be built to meet a variety of functional and non-functional requirements including safety, reliability, availability, and maintainability. During the development process, designers aim to construct Safety Critical Systems in such a way that these requirements are satisfied. Due to the importance of these requirements, however, it is essential to assess, as an independent activity, the extent to which they have been met. It is also becoming more common for the developers to have to provide regulatory authorities with a structured presentation of the safety assessments, e.g. to the Joint Airworthiness Authority, Railways Inspectorate, or Nuclear Installations Inspectorate as appropriate. Such presentations have come to be known as safety cases.
Typically, a safety case will contain high level argument (HLA), and supporting evidence (SE). The HLA will set out the principles on which the design is based, and reasons why the design should satisfy the safety requirements; the SE is obtained from analysis of the design and is used to back up the claims of the HLA. In this paper we will be principally concerned with safety analyses used to build up the supporting evidence. The reader is referred to (McDermid, 1994) for a description of how the high level argument can be developed and supported.
There is a diverse range of safety analysis techniques in common use, and it is beneficial to group them into a number of categories. To do this we first provide a simple characterisation of safety analysis. We assume that the reader is familiar with terms such as hazard, accident, severity, risk etc.; any readers not familiar with these terms should consult (IEC, 1994 ) for more precise definitions and for a more comprehensive description of the safety analysis process.
A safety requirement is often a statement that a particular hazard does not occur with a probability of more than X. There are various techniques for determining the potential hazards for a system and we term these Hazard Identification Techniques. Given a set of hazards it is then necessary to determine the potential causes (normally in terms of failures) and estimate the likelihood of each hazard. We term such techniques Causal Analyses. It is also necessary to determine the potential accidents which can arise from the hazards and their likelihoods, and give each a severity rating. We term such techniques Consequence Analyses. Armed with the data from these analyses, it is then possible to derive a measure of the risk associated with a hazard. If the risk for a hazard is unacceptable, then the design may have to be modified. In many cases there is a goal to make the risk for the hazard As Low As Reasonably Practical-the ALARP principle, as required by law, (HMSO, 1974) .
Hazard Identification techniques include Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS), see (Kletz, 1992) and (CISHEC, 1977) , Hazard Analysis (HAZAN), see (Kletz, 1992) , Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), and Zonal Hazard Analysis. Causal Analysis techniques include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), see (Veseley, 1981) , and Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), see (DoD, 1980) . The classical Consequence Analysis technique is Event Tree Analysis (ETA). (Villemeur, 1992) , provides comprehensive descriptions of most of these techniques, although he uses a slightly different terminology.
Integration of the Safety Analysis Techniques
The overall safety case for a system will usually employ a number of different types of safety analysis techniques and these individual analyses will not be independent. For example, a Fault Tree used to determine the causes of a hazard may utilise the failure likelihoods from manufacturers' component data and also from any relevant FMECA. A FMECA itself may also identify hazards.
Despite the strong relationships, in practice the techniques are poorly linked. The flows of data between the analyses, and the rules that should hold if the analyses are to give a coherent view of the system, are usually treated in an ad hoc manner. To be more precise, there is often traceability from hazards to the causal and consequence analyses, but little else. This is very surprising, given that the collective results go a long way to determining whether or not a regulator or certification agency deems that a system is acceptably safe for use.
It is possible to formulate a set of pairwise data-flow, completeness and consistency rules that should hold between analyses. The primary value of such rules is that they can be used to ensure consistency in a safety case; their secondary value is that they assist change management.
By characterising each technique in terms of 'imports' (data imports) and 'exports' (output results) it is possible to state the rules relatively unambiguously. Stating the rules on a pairwise basis does have a number of disadvantages: some rules are too complex; it is difficult to take account of the hierarchical nature of systems under analysis; and it leads to a rather disjointed view of the safety analysis process.
We can address these problems by formulating an abstract model to underly the safety analysis process. In this framework each analysis technique has its exports written to the data model. Thus the data model acts as a medium for data propagation. In addition to this it is possible to check analyses with respect to the data model's contents, and also provide checks over the data model itself. This provides the benefits of the pairwise model, but is more flexible.
To make such a data model practical it is necessary to provide tool support. The SAM (Safety Argument Manager), , provides support for a set of safety analysis techniques with specialised read and write operations on a database. We will return to the issue of tool support later in this paper.
Related work
There are a number of emerging standards for the development of safety critical systems, (HSE, 1992) , (IEC, 1994) , (JAA, 1990) , (MoD, 1993) . These standards constrain the overall development process, and give guidance on the design and analysis techniques to be used. They do not attempt to relate the techniques at the level of detail we require, although they give an implicit linkage through the process descriptions. (Woodcock, 1994) has provided a formalisation of Defence Standard 00-56, (MoD, 1993) , but does not attempt to relate individual techniques to a formal model of the process-which is what we are aiming to do.
There has been a substantial amount of research into viewpoints in the software engineering research community, and part of its aim is the integration of diverse methods. Some of the notations developed (Nuseibeh, 1994) , could be used to specify the consistency rules more formally, although to date such work has concentrated in the area of Requirements Capture. (Collins and Dent, 1994) , have developed a tool for managing reliability, safety and other concurrent engineering information. This work is closest in spirit to the work we are undertaking with SAM, but we are not aware of any attempt by them to formalise the relations between the safety analysis techniques.
Structure of the rest of the paper
In section 2 we select a subset of safety analysis techniques and characterise them in terms of import and export data. In section 3 we describe the rules that should hold between the techniques, and in section 4 we present our data model. We provide a detailed case study carried out with SAM in section 5, illustrating how the data model can support integrated safety assessment. In section 6 we make some concluding remarks and indicate the future direction of our work.
THE SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
There are a large number of safety and reliability assessment techniques in industrial use. It is impractical to consider them all, and so we will take a representative subset, with coverage of the categories identified earlier. We believe it is more important to present our overall approach, rather than to show how to integrate all of the techniques. Note that our descriptions of the techniques are necessarily brief and the reader is referred to the papers and books identified in section 1 for more detail.
Hazard Identification
.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS): is a guideword/checklist based approach to identify the potential hazards for a system, their causes and severities (based on the flows in a system). 
System modelling
To set out our consistency rules we also need to identify some other elements necessary for safety assessment. All of the previously described techniques are carried out with respect to some model of the system and its components. So, at the very least, we need to be able to model systems and their components.
. Models: provide descriptions of the system at various levels of abstraction. Models identify a number of interconnected components which comprise the system. We will also need raw data on the components of a system:
. Data Sheets: record details of failure modes that may arise for a component coupled with measures of rates of occurrence.
Risk assessment
Given a likelihood and a severity it is possible to calculate the risk. The meaning of risk will depend upon the system and its environment. Some of the industrial standards prescribe risk tables, but we take the more general approach and propose a mechanism for specifying customised tables:
. Risk Tables (RT) : provide a simple calculation of risk, based on probability and severity.
Most industries use a Hazard Log to track the hazards identified and analysed for a system.
. Hazard Log: records details of the hazards, and the steps taken to mitigate against them.
Miscellaneous
.
Gathered Fault Combinations (GFC)
: is a method for grouping related failures into equivalence classes, to cut down on the scale of subsequent analyses.
We can now define each technique purely in terms of its imports and exports-see Table 1 .
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TECHNIQUES
Given the above set of techniques we can now consider the data propagation, completeness and consistency rules which should hold between the techniques. As a first example, consider the relationship between a System FMECA and Equipment FMECAs:
The System FMECA should consider all of the Equipment Effects (and their rates) calculated in the Equipment FMECAs for the Equipment comprising the system. This rule is one of data propagation. The effects and their rates determined in the Equipment FMECAs should propagate through to the System FMECA. Secondly consider the relationship between an Equipment FMECA and a Model of that Equipment:
All Components of the Equipment (and only those) should be considered.
This rule is one of completeness, but it also constrains consistency since no extra components should be referenced.
We now go on to give a more comprehensive set of rules in Tables 2 and 3 . These rules are stated informally. We have also developed a formal specification of these rules in Z, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. Some examples of how these rules can be generalised and formalised are given in section 5. The table is not an ideal form for the rules, as we shall explain, but it provides a useful stepping stone in developing checkable forms of the rules.
The rules that we have presented have been found to be a useful and acceptable set for the industrial partners involved with the project. We are not claiming that this is the definitive set, or that following them will lead to a correct safety case. Rather we believe that adopting them should allow engineers to have more confidence in the consistency and completeness of safety assessments and safety cases. The intention is that they can be augmented with project specific rules. This is necessary because the techniques overlap in their analytical capability and role, so different combinations of tech-niques are used in practice; further, there are many variants of the techniques, although the basic principles are invariant. Consequently, as we shall see, we are more concerned with the form of these rules, and how such rules can be supported generally. Before we can consider support for such rules we will make a number of observations.
The techniques use different terminology and use data in different forms. For example a Fault Tree usually uses probabilities whereas a FMECA is typically expressed in terms of rates. It is difficult to capture the necessary intermediate data transformations in a table such as this.
The input failure modes to a System FMECA may be taken directly from Equipment FMECAs, or indirectly from Gathered Fault Combinations-this kind of 'either.
. .
or.
. . ' approach is difficult to capture in a table such as this.
It is also necessary to make a number of assumptions about the analysis process and how the techniques are used. For example such rules assume that an FTA is used to determine the casues of a hazard, whereas in practice we may wish to identify the causes of a non-hazardous event, or use an analysis technique other than FTA, such as Cause Consequence Analysis. So the rules as stated in Tables 2 and  3 represent unnecessarily strict constraints on the analysis process.
A more fundamental problem is that rules stated in this form make for a rather disjointed view of the overall safety analysis process. We propose a solution to this and the other problems in the next section.
THE UNDERLYING DATA MODEL
In the previous section we made a number of observations on our consistency rules. These observations led us to believe that defining a data model to underpin the safety analysis process would be beneficial. A unifying data model should:
provide a cohesive view of the overall safety analysis process;
. be extensible (allow the integration of additional safety analysis techniques);
. allow generalisations of our original consistency rules;
. allow the definition of further rules and queries over the data model itself.
An Entity Relationship representation of our data model appears in Figure 1 . We will now explain the rationale behind it.
Models of the system and its components
As a first step we need to be able to model systems at various levels of abstraction. It is absolutely essential that we can refer to parts of systems unambiguously, and capture states and events relating to them. We would also like to be able to capture 'types' of components so that if a certain type of component is used in a number of places then we can reuse the data and analyses for it, rather than repeat them each time.
In Figure 1 , we define three entities: System, View-point and Component. A system can have a number of viewpoints associated with it, captured by the HasViewpoint relationship. Different viewpoints include hardware, functional, and flow based decompositions of a system, with the intention that an analysis is performed over a particular viewpoint: for example a FMECA would be performed over a hardware
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THE COMPUTER JOURNAL, VOL. 38, NO. 10, 1995 The circular nature of these relations relating the entities allows a hierarchy of system models to be captured in the data model. Systems that we wish to treat as primitive 'black-boxes' would not have any viewpoints associated with them. The model of a system in its environment would form the model at the top of the hierarchy, and components treated as black boxes would appear at the bottom.
We can define completeness and consistency checks over this model information. Note that we prefer to have checks rather than enforced rules to allow for a concurrent engineering environment: during the development of a system, the design and assessments will often be incomplete and have inconsistencies, so our data model has to permit them. As we progress through the system lifecycle such problems are gradually eradicated. Given a database implementation of the data model, as SAM has, we can give error reports on all System models that are defined in terms of themselves; a System, S, is defined in terms of itself if it contains a Component, C, which has type S, or has sub-Components (or sub-subComponents, etc.) with type S. We can also report on Components defined in terms of unknown System models, and on System models which are not used.
Conditions
Now that we are able to unambiguously refer to parts of a system we can introduce the notion of a Condition. A Condition is an abstraction used to capture some 'state of affairs' in the system, be it an event or system state. Faults, Failures, Hazards, and Accidents will simply be Conditions that are given special treatment. The reason for this is that any Condition could, in theory, have a full set of analyses carried out on it-i.e. we are not restricted to only carrying out ETAs on Hazards for instance. This also avoids the problems of different terminology between analysis techniques.
A Condition will be uniquely identified by a System, Component and a Name (a full definition of the condition will be an attribute of the Condition). A System must always be supplied. A condition may not be about any particular component (it has a null component), and in this case it is either about the System as a whole, i.e. it describes externally visible behaviour of some part of the system, or some subset of the components in the System. For example Faults would be about a given Component within a System whereas Failures would not.
The relationships IsOverSystem and IsOverComponent record the links to Systems and Components respectively. We do not associate conditions with viewpoints in the data model, so that we can have conditions spanning viewpoints. We can produce error reports on those Conditions that are over unknown Systems, and those that are over an unknown Component within a known System.
Properties of conditions
In sub-section 1.1 we provided a simple characterisation of the safety analysis process, and this suggests the properties that need to be captured for conditions:
We use the term likelihood to encompass both probability and rate (or frequency) of occurrence. In Figure 1 we have three entities corresponding to the above properties: Likelihood, Severity, and Risk, linked to Conditions by the relations HasLikelihood, HasSeverity, and HasRisk respectively. It may seem a little unusual that we have these as entities rather than as attributes, there are three reasons for this:
we wish to allow likelihoods for the same condition to be expressed in different units-e.g. probability, rates (per hour, per flight, etc.);
. we need to be able to record the particular piece of analysis that provided the property for the condition;
. we also need to make the properties optional (although this does not necessitate use of entities, it does make for a cleaner approach).
The data model can also be enriched to include the definition of classes (ranges) for the above properties, in much the same way as 00-56, (MoD, 1993) , does. Due to space constraints, we omit it from this presentation.
We can produce error reports where properties are recorded for unknown conditions, and also where likelihoods expressed in different units are inconsistent (given rules for transforming between the different units).
Causes and consequences
A Condition, C, can have a number of alternative causes, each alternative consisting of a number of other conditions, individually necessary and jointly sufficient to cause C. Causes stated in this way are said to be in disjunctive normal form; indeed the cutsets produced by fault trees are in this form.
So we have an entity type known as Cause, the relationship HasCause relates Causes to Conditions, and the relationship CutSetContains defines the Conditions which are conjoined to make an individual cutset cause.
We also add another entity type, Consequence, defined to be a Condition. We relate Conditions to their Consequences with the HasConsequence relationship, and define a Consequence with ConsequenceIs relationship. A consequence could be defined as a simple relationship between Conditions, but we need to be able to point at a consequence and record the individual analysis that deduced it. It is theoretically possible to define consequences to be the inverse of the causal relationships, but we define it separately for convenience. This does mean, however, that we must ensure the consequences and causes relationships do not become inconsistent.
We can report on those unknown Conditions that are given causes, and those unknown Conditions that are part of cutset causes (similar checks can be defined for Consequences).
Originating analyses
For every element in the data model, we need to be able to track which particular piece of analysis or model provided that data. This allows dependencies to be tracked and change managed more effectively. In reality the Entity Relationship diagram (Figure 1 ) of the data model should contain an extra entity Source with links to all other entities. We have omitted it for reasons of clarity.
Gathering conditions
It is often useful to group related Conditions into equivalence classes so that they can be treated collectively in subsequent analyses, thus avoiding needless repetitionin other words we need to provide support for Gathered Fault Combinations. This has been omitted from Figure 1 for reasons of simplicity.
Miniminal integrity rules and checks
We described some integrity rules for our data model as we built up the entities and the relationships. We have developed a more comprehensive set of rules for our data model (based around a Z specification), but a full treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT
In this section we will present a detailed example demonstrating how the rules and the data model can be used to achieve integrated safety assessment. We do this with reference to the SAM tool; it is possible to do this without reference to SAM, but the benefits are more obvious if we do.
Modelling a system
Consider as an example the design and assessment of a Computer Aided Braking System (CABS), in which the mechanical linkage between brake pedal and hydraulic
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brake system is replaced by pedal pressure sensors and a number of computer controlled brake actuators. The CABS is intended to provide enhanced performance, with anti-lock braking, emergency stop detection, and so on. It should be stressed that the example is primarily intended to illustrate the concepts that we are developing, it should not be viewed as a definitive statement on the design and safety assessment of a computer aided braking system. We can capture a high level functional design for this system within SAM, as shown in Figure 2 . This is the functional viewpoint of the CABS system.
The CABS has sensors to get readings on brake pedal pressure, wheel rotation, axle load, and brake pressure feedback (Sensor_values). The IN process will take in these sensor readings, and apply various range checks and conversions before passing them onto the other processes in the system, via Pedal, All_sens1, and All_sens2. Note that IN also informs MONITOR (via Data_sent) that it has passed these values on to the braking functions (see below), so that MONITOR knows when to expect output from the braking functions. There are three algorithms to decide on the Braking pressure to apply: BASIC, ENHANCED1, and ENHANCED2. Each of these processes will pass their results to the MONITOR process. MONITOR will pass on the results to OUT, however it will only pass on results from ENHANCED1 and ENHANCED2 if it received a corresponding message on Data_sent. Assuming the availability of the results, OUT will give preference to ENHANCED2, then ENHANCED1, and finally fall back to BASIC. ENHANCED2 provides the most sophisticated Braking algorithm, followed by ENHANCED1 and then BASIC. The OUT process converts the chosen result into appropriate values to send to the actuators (via Actuator_control). Note that the OUT process also gets feedback from the sensors (Feedback_sens) to ensure that the applied braking pressure does not increase or decrease too dramatically. ENHANCED2 provides full anti-lock braking on each wheel, ENHANCED1 provides anti-lock braking based on axle loads, and BASIC provides brake pressure proportional to pedal pressure and travel (the same for each wheel).
Once the System Model has been built with the SAM Model Editor the details can be exported to the database; this operation will update the tables corresponding to the System, Viewpoint and Component entities, and the associated relationships.
Analysis based on the model
We can now perform a HAZOP based on the functional model of CABS. Within SAM we can invoke the HAZOP Editor, input the name of the system and the viewpoint to perform the analysis over. The system name is CABS and the viewpoint is Functional (note that system and viewpoint names are user defined). There is an operation to generate a template HAZOPS, based on the principles outlined in (McDermid and Pumfrey, 1994) . SAM does this by reading all of the flows and their flow types, reading all of the properties of interest for the flow types, reading all of the deviation guide words that should be considered for the properties, and finally producing a list of flows with types, properties and deviation guide words. By doing this it is possible to ensure the consistency of the analysis with the Model of the system: we have effectively implemented the rule relating HAZOPS and Model in Tables 2 and 3 . If later the model changes it is possible to re-generate a template of the HAZOPS, but preserving any effects which have been entered. A fragment of the deviations to consider appears in Table 4 , in reality there are a large number of deviations to consider (11 flows * 6 guide words 66) and having SAM generate them does save a great deal of time. Note that all of the flows in our example are data flows, and so they do not have multiple properties defined. In other examples where one is considering fluid flow for example, it is useful to identify properties such as temperature and rate, and produce guide words specifically for those properties (SAM also provides a special editor for doing this).
Within the HAZOP editor it is possible to attach effects (an effect will just be a condition) to the deviations: a set of hazards identified by the HAZOP process appears in Table  5 . We have illustrated how different deviations can lead to the same effect, and we have also given an example of a deviation which leads to a non-hazardous effect. Note that, rather unsurprisingly, most of the hazards were thrown up by consideration of deviations on Actuator_control-the ultimate output of the CABS. Note that HAZOPS often provides tentative causes for the Hazard, we omit this from our presentation because we are more interested in the rigorous enumeration of their causes with a more powerful Causal Technique-Fault Trees (see later).
Each effect can have details entered indicating whether or not it is hazardous and the severity associated with it, see Table 6 . Most users of HAZOPS will ascribe a Severity to identified Hazards (in this example they are either Major or Catastrophic), an alternative is to carry out Event Tree Analyses for the Hazards, and consider the follow on accidents to obtain a measure of the Hazard's severities. The hazardous effects can then be exported to the SAM database, thereby updating the tables corresponding to Condition and Severity entities. Each condition will also be tagged as being a Hazard.
Causal analysis of hazards
We can now perform Fault Tree Analyses for these hazards, this can be done with the SAM Fault Tree Editor, by giving it the name of a top level event and importing its details from the database. We provide a Fault Tree Analysis for the Inappropriate Control Hazard, see Figure 3 .
Inappropriate control can occur if a wrong value from ENHANCED1 OR ENHANCED2 OR BASIC gets through. A wrong value from BASIC can get through only if ENHANCED1 failed to deliver a value, AND ENHANCED2 failed to deliver a value, AND BASIC delivered the wrong value (because of OUT's ENHANCED1, ENHANCED2, BASIC priority ordering). A wrong value can be delivered by BASIC either because of hardware failure OR BASIC calculating a wrong value. A hardware failure could be caused by memory corruption OR CAN Bus failure. BASIC can calculate a wrong value either because of sensor failure OR algorithm failure. The diamonds in the Fault Tree are events that we choose not to develop any further, and ellipse events are assumed to be basic failures; box events are undesired events.
For the basic failures, for example, we can import their likelihoods from the database, assuming that they have been put there, either directly through data sheets, or they could be derived by performing Equipment FME(C)As. In this example we concentrate on the qualitative aspects of the analysis, especially since software failure is difficult to quantify.
It is usual to perform a Minimal Cut Set Analysis of fault trees which reduces them to disjunctive normal form (sum of products). Each conjunct will be a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to cause the hazard, which simplifies the mathematics if likelihoods are to be calculated. We can get SAM to perform the cut set analysis, using the numeric labels of the Fault Tree nodes we get the following expression: The causes of this hazard can then be exported to the database, and if a likelihood has been calculated then this would be exported too.
Assessing completeness of analyses
After we believe that we have performed all of our Fault Trees we can check the following rule:
All Hazardous Effects appear as a Hazard Top Event in some FTA.
An advantage of the data model is that such constraints can be generalized, and this particular example can be generalized as follows:
All Hazardous effects have had their causes enumerated and their likelihoods evaluated Leading on from this it is possible to state such rules formally in a predicate language, we do this for the first part of the above rule:
We are in the early stages of designing support for a simple predicate language based around the CADiZ toolset, (Jordan et al., 1990) , so that such predicates can be typed checked and evaluated. We have also defined SQL queries and executed them over the SAM database; using this approach allows us to find which elements of our data fail the rules in a convenient manner. It also possible to envisage a situation where template Fault Tree Analyses are automatically generated for any hazards in the database. Intuitively such rules should be user defined, so that users can define their own process on top of the completeness and consistency rules. This may be a possible extension of our work.
Safety analysis as a design driver
Note that the results of safety analysis are often used to drive the more detailed design, not just measure the reliability and safety of a built system. We observe that if ENHANCED1 or ENHANCED2 provide a wrong value then the hazard will occur-this implies that we should make ENHANCED1 and ENHANCED2 'fail silent'. The remaining four causes relate to BASIC failing, and because of the ultimate reliance on BASIC's value we should develop it to a high integrity, perhaps running it on triply redundant hardware.
Analysis of the hardware viewpoint
As well as the functional model presented earlier we can give a description of the hardware that the CABS is to run on. We present this model in Figure 4 . Each box represents some component, the first label is the name of that component, and the second label is its type. On the far left we have the sensor inputs to the system, we have three Processors (PROCESSOR1, PROCESSOR2, PROCES-SOR3) which are all 68020s. We have duplicated buses, BUS1 and BUS2, both implemented as Controller Area Network buses (CANBus). The OUTPUTMODULE is to be implemented as an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC1). On the far right are the actuators, of type BrakeActuator.
We make this the hardware viewpoint of CABS within SAM, and export its details to the database: updating the tables corresponding to System, Viewpoint, and Component respectively.
We can input Data Sheets on the types of components used, supplying their failure modes and likelihoods. These can be exported into the SAM database, updating Condition and Likelihood tables. We can check the rule relating Data Sheets and Models in Tables 2 and 3. Note that we could perform an equipment FMEA on the ASIC once built to determine its failure modes (in the example below we take these failure modes as given). The likelihoods for failure modes could be imported into the fault tree given previously, for example CAN Bus Failure (had we decomposed it into its primitive failure modes of course).
Given this we can invoke the FMECA Editor, and set the system, to CABS and the viewpoint to hardware, and request generation of a template FMECA, see Table 7 . The generation is effected by application of the rules relating Models, Data Sheets and FMECAs in Tables 2 and 3. The user can then consider the effects of the failure modes on the system and enter their details. For example we would find that failure of the OUTPUTMODULE could lead to hazardous effects, see Table 8 .
We can then export the effects together with their causes, and their likelihoods; SAM performs a simple summation of failure mode likelihoods for this. In this example there is only one cause, so the likelihoods would be taken directly from the likelihoods of the failure modes.
We observe that the following requirement:
No Single Point of Failure Can lead to a hazard has not been met, as a failure of the OUTPUTMODULE can cause a hazard. This was justified in the design of the CABS since the failure of the hydraulic brakes also presents a single point of failure, and duplicating actuators would be extremely complex. The no single point of failure leading to hazard requirement can be expressed in a formal way: (In reality this predicate would have to filter the cutset for fault events only, however we have kept it simple for the purposes of illustration.)
Checking requirements against the data model
The data model captures the assessed view of a system under analysis. Once all of the completeness and consistency checks have been satisfied, it is possible to evaluate safety requirements over the contents of the data model.
All Hazards must have tolerable risk
Once again this can be formulated as a predicate expression, and evaluated: This could indeed be evaluated in our example for the two hazards that had their likelihood quantified by the FMECA.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how a suitable data model can be used to integrate a set of safety analysis and system modelling techniques, allowing data propagation, and completeness and consistency checks to be specificed and evaluated. We then demonstrated the utility of the approach with a significant example carried out with the SAM tool. We have not been able to demonstrate all of the rules in action or all of the facilities of SAM but we hope that we have given a flavour of what can be done with an integrated approach.
In conjunction with our industrial partners (British Aerospace, Rolls Royce, and Lloyds Register and York Software Engineering), we are currently carrying out moderately sized case studies using the SAM tool. Unfortunately this work is not in the public domain, but the evidence so far suggests that the approach is both valid and useful. We expect to enhance the data model and SAM in the light of this experience. 
